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RENT SUBSIDIES
An Impact Evaluation and an Application





Several studies have evaluated the experimental housing allowance program authorized
by Congress in 1970 and implemented by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. The studies that are relied upon most have nevertheless been considered
inadequate because they were essentially case studies. An evaluation design has recently
been suggested, the random-comparison-group design, that makes the data from the
Administrative Agency Experiment useful for evaluation. The outcomes in the AAE
program sites are compared here to projected outcomes based on an analysis of Annual
Housing Survey data. The evaluation finds that rent burdens were reduced and housing
quality was improved jor many who lived in substandard units. These impacts were
achieved without producing inflation. Substantial confidence in the findings is permitted
not only by the logic of the method itself, but by corroboration from other research. The
design employed is found to be practical and powerful for certain evaluations, and its
use in connection with other public programs can be recommended. The random-
comparison-group design could substitute for randomized experiments in situations in
which such controlled experimentation is not possible or was not carried out.
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE
EXPERIMENTAL HOUSING ALLOWANCE PROGRAM
The experimental housing allowance program (EHAP) was autho-
rized by Congress in the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970.
AUTHORS’ NOTE: This research was supported in part by a grant from the Sloan
Foundation to the Institute of Public Policy Studies, The University of Michigan. for
studies in public management.
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Three experiments, the demand experiment, the supply experiment, and
the administrative agency experiment, were designed to test the concept
of providing direct cash payments to families in need to assist them in
obtaining adequate housing. The experimental program was established
to answer a number of important questions concerning housing
allowances including the following:
(I) Who would participate in a housing allowance program? What types of
households (husband-wife, single parent)? Could both whites and minorities
secure adequate housing and participate?
(2) How would participating households use their allowance payments?
(3) Would the quality of housing improve for participating households?
(4) Would a housing allowance program cause participants to change the location of
their housing?
(5) Would landlords and homeowners rehabilitate substandard properties and
increase maintenance?
(6) What would happen to the price of housing? Would there be significant market
responses to a housing allowance program?
(7) What alternatives exist for administering the program?
(8) What are the probable costs of a nationwide housing allowance program? (Struyk
and Bendick, 1981)
Even though each of the three experiments conducted under EHAP
separately addressed many of the questions raised above, they all had
specialized functions. The demand experiment examined the questions
of how housing-allowance recipients used their housing allowances,
residential mobility generated by the experiment, and the fulfillment of
housing quality requirements. Conducted in Phoenix, Arizona, and
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the demand experiment was the only true
experiment in terms of research design. Participants were randomly
assigned to treatment and control groups in both cities. The cities were
selected on the basis of availability of housing and the quality of the
housing stock (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
1980: 20-29).
The supply experiment examined the impact of housing allowances
on housing markets. The major issues addressed were the impact of the
program on housing price inflation in markets where vouchers were
being used, and the extent to which landlords and homeowners would
rehabilitate substandard properties and increase maintenance. Two
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counties were selected for the experiment-Brown County, Wisconsin,
and St. Joseph County, Indiana (U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development, 1980). Unlike the demand experiment, the supply
experiment’s design permitted open enrollment to all income-eligible
citizens within each of the jurisdictions as opposed to random selection
of participants from an eligible applicant pool. Lacking a control group,
the experiment relied more heavily on time-series data collected over the
10-year period, 1974 to 1984.
The administrative agency experiment (AAE), which will serve as the
focus of this analysis, was designed to provide information on manage-
ment issues in an allowance program. The experiment was implemented
in eight different housing markets across the country by eight public
agencies. Information was collected on different administrative proce-
dures, the costs of the procedures. and the experiences of agencies and
participants in the program. The criteria for selecting the agencies
included interest of local agencies and government bodies in partici-
pating ; market size and vacancy rate; diversity of population and
housing market characteristics; and an assessment of the overall
feasibility of running the AAE in the site. The sites and agencies selected
were Jacksonville Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Jacksonville, Florida; San Bernardino County Board of Supervisors,
San Bernardino, California; Department of Community Affairs, Spring-
field, Massachusetts; State of Illinois Department of Local Government
Affairs (Office of Housing and Buildings), Peoria, Illinois; Social
Services Board of North Dakota, Bismarck, North Dakota; Durham
County Department of Social Services, Durham, North Carolina; Tulsa
Housing Authority, Tulsa, Oklahoma; and the Housing Authority of
the City of Salem, Salem, Oregon.
The administrative agency experiment’s design was the most contro-
versial and considered the weakest among the three experiments. The
major problem stems from the lack of controlled variation in the admin-
istrative functions administered by the agencies (Kershaw and Williams,
1981 ). Each agency was given a broad set of program guidelines and was
allowed to develop its own procedures for eight required administrative
functions (outreach, income certification, enrollment, counseling, ser-
vices, housing inspections, payments, and termination). The rationale
for this approach was to select the most successful procedure for each of
the administrative functions in designing the national housing allowance
program. Even though the agencies differed in terms of how they
designed and implemented their administrative procedures, the eligi-
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bility requirements for participation in the program were consistent
across the eight cities.
In addition to case study material collected on the implementation of
the administrative functions, termed as &dquo;soft data&dquo; by HUD officials,
hard data were collected on participant attrition at each stage of the
program as well as on the demographic characteristics of participants.
In addition, panel data on housing conditions of a random sample of the
participants (n = 747) were collected as part of the AAE data base. The
original intent in collecting these data was to allow for comparisons of
the impact of the housing allowance program across the AAE, demand,
and supply experiments. This cross-program comparison, called the
&dquo;integrated analysis,&dquo; never evolved according to plan. Nevertheless, a
final report synthesizing results from the three separate experiments was
produced by the Urban Institute (see Struyk and Bendick, 1981).
The data from the administrative agency experiment are an under-
valued resource for scholars and policymakers designing and evaluating
social welfare programs. It is true that the exact content of &dquo;the
program&dquo; remains undefined because of variations in implementation
across the individual sites. Nevertheless, the essential core of any such
program is the granting of subsidies to eligible families, and this was
common to the sites in the administrative agency experiment. The
purpose of this article is to use the hard data collected in the
administrative agency experiment both to learn something about the
impact of the program and to illustrate how data collected from
demonstration projects such as the AAE can be combined with more
general purpose data (such as those collected through the decennial
census or the Annual Housing Survey) to evaluate the impact of
government programs on various social problems. The potential value
of this demonstration is significant for a number of reasons. First,
real-world experimentation such as the EHAP is extremely costly (see
Table 1).
Second, experiments like the supply and demand experiments are
limited in their generalizability given the nature and small number of
cities used in each. For example, the two cities in the supply experi-
ment-Green Bay and South Bend-have been criticized for &dquo;having
market conditions qualitatively different from those in large, old,
decaying, urban centers such as Detroit, Cleveland or Newark&dquo; (Kain,
1981: 358). Given the inability to generalize from the EHAP results, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development has in fact authorized
a new Housing Demonstration Project costing almost $1.5 million. This
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TABLE 1
Experimental Housing Allowance Program Costs
(in millions of dollars)
SOURCE: Struyk and Bendick (1981: 297); estimates as of April 1980; copyright
1981 by The Urban Institute.
demonstration, according to Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Samuel Pierce, &dquo;will show that vouchers are the most efficient
vehicle for providing housing assistance to low-income families, regard-
less of where they live-in big cities, small towns, or rural areas (U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1985).
Third, personnel used in these two experiments were affiliated with
the experiment as opposed to being drawn from the local personnel
population that would normally run a housing allowance program.
Their involvement serves as a possible contaminating factor for the
results obtained. Finally, the use of experimental and control groups
such as were employed in the demand experiment is politically infeasible
in most studies given that every group has a desire to get some of the
treatment. Therefore, the potential for alternative designs to yield
comparably reliable results is an important issue.
For these reasons we give special attention to data collected in the
AAE, which represents the typical demonstration project used to test
the effects of government subsidies in that the design involves no
random assignment. The AAE represents an opportunity for the
employment of the &dquo;random-comparison-group design&dquo; (Mohr, 1982)
in testing the effects of a housing allowance program on low-income
families. The design differs from most others in that it purports to
accomplish much of what is accomplished by a randomized experiment,
but without the random assignment of subjects to treatments (another
example is the regression-discontinuity design; see Trochim, 1984). No
application of the random-comparison-group design has previously
been published.
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS
TREATMENT AND COMPARISON GROUP SAMPLES
This article demonstrates the use of the random-comparison-group
design in cases where researchers are either unable to or fail to assign
clients to treatment and control groups at random. In the Experimental
Housing Allowance Program’s administrative agency experiment,
evaluation data were collected only on clients who received the
treatment. The data collection effort involved taking a random sample
of clients who enrolled in the program and collecting extensive
information on their housing conditions before and after the program.
The data were collected in three waves (consisting of the same program
clients) immediately before the treatment, immediately after the treat-
ment, and near the termination of the program. The initial sample had a
total of 795 enrollees, but not all of them had complete records.
Eliminating the latter left a sample size of 747 for the purposes of this
analysis. In addition to demographic information, such as race, sex, and
household size, data on housing conditions, rent, and mobility (before
and after the program) were collected.
The comparison group to be employed and discussed in the next
section was constructed for the analysis using similar data from the
national file of the Annual Housing Survey for the years 1974 and 1975,
administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
This time period closely approximates the time period in which the
experiment was run. In determining the comparison group, only
households that satisfied the criteria used in certifying clients for the
EHAP program were chosen. The unweighted sample size for the
Annual Housing Survey comparison group was 3040. The Appendix
outlines in detail the criteria used in selecting households for the
comparison group.
MEASURING HOUSING DEPRIVATION
The term housing deprivation is used to describe areas of housing
need that are most prevalent among low-income families needing
housing assistance. The three most common indicators used in deter-
mining the level of a family’s housing deprivation are the percentage of
income a family pays for rent, the number of persons per room in a
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housing unit, and the quality of a family’s housing unit. Neighborhood
quality is also used, but less frequently, as a measure of housing
deprivation.
When measuring a family’s rent relative to its income, most analysts
use 25% as a crude demarcator of rent burden. Families paying more
than 25% of their income for rent are considered as having an
undesirable rent burden. In terms of crowding, the total number of
rooms in a housing unit is divided by the number of residents living in
the given unit to determine persons per room. Families with more than
1.5 persons per room are considered to be living in overcrowded
housing.
The indicators for measuring housing quality are less straightforward
than those for rent burden and crowding. The U.S. Bureau of the Census
at one point used lack of plumbing as the only measure of housing
quality. Census enumerators later began classifying units as &dquo;dilapi-
dated&dquo; and &dquo;not dilapidated. &dquo;Today, the question of what indicators to
use in measuring housing quality remains a topic of much debate. The
Appendix outlines in detail the operationalization of housing quality, as
well as the other measures of housing deprivation used in this analysis.
For the purposes of this analysis attention will be devoted to four
variables: the magnitude of reductions in out-of-pocket rent itself
(controlled for income), rent burden, number of persons per room, and
the incidence of substandard housing. The major questions raised are:
What was the impact of the program in reducing rent, rent burden,
crowding, and substandard housing for participating clients in the eight
sites under investigation? Second, we ask: How was the subsidy used?
That is, how much of it was spent to ameliorate each of the types of
deprivation targeted? These goals resemble the original goals of the
demand and supply experiments much more than those of the AAE; the
purpose is in part to investigate the value of AAE-type data as a
substitute for or supplement to the other, more unusual kinds of
experiment.
These questions do comport with the design and goals of the housing
allowance program. The program operated on the notion that families
could find decent, safe, and sanitary housing at affordable prices if the
federal government could provide them with a housing voucher
reflecting the difference between 25% of their income and the cost of a
standard unit in the market in which they lived. By examining the
average reductions in the areas of deprivation, one would hope to be
able to estimate the extent to which these goals were fulfilled.
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TABLE ? 2
Results Based on the Before-After Design
RESULTS
The work presented here will measure program impacts on housing
deprivation employing two different quasi-experimental designs. First,
we employ the &dquo;before-after design&dquo; or Campbell and Stanley’s &dquo;Design
2&dquo; (Campbell and Stanley, 1966: 8). Design 2 is applied to the treatment
group alone. Next, the random-comparison-group design (Mohr, 1982)
will be employed using the treatment group and the Annual Housing
Survey comparison group developed for this analysis.
Design 2. The before-after or pretest-posttest design rests on the
assumption that if not for the program, housing deprivation for the
treatment group would have remained constant at preprogram levels.
Therefore, the program’s impact may be obtained by subtracting the
&dquo;before&dquo; measures from the &dquo;after.&dquo; Table 2 presents these results for
rent, rent burden, housing quality, and crowding.
If one were to base one’s conclusions on an analysis of the Design-2
data shown in Table 2, the following observations would seem to be
indicated: On average, the subsidy produced a rent saving of $46.71 per
month, which means that nearly half (42%) of the original or &dquo;before&dquo;
rent was freed for other uses. Rent burden, similarly, went from 43% of
income to 23%, so that the burden was approximately halved by the
subsidy. The subsidy does appear to have brought the rent burden down
below the level of the 25% mark, which was a goal. The housing quality
data indicate that the failure rate went from 12% of the items failed to
6%. Because quality was measured on a six-item scale (see Appendix),
these figures mean an improvement from an average of 0.72 items failed
per household before to 0.36 items afterwards. In other words, the
housing of these individuals was only slightly substandard to begin with
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and the program improved quality by halving the average number of
items failed. This is a modest impact in terms of raw improvement, but
improvement generally becomes quite difficult to achieve as one
approaches the very bottom or top of a measurement scale, as here.
Crowding appears truly not to have been a problem to begin with. Given
a maximum of 1.5 persons per room as a standard, the before-program
average of 0.7 persons per room represents adequate conditions; it
compares well with the commonly held middle-class model of a family
of four in a six-room house (0.67 persons per room). The change from
before to after is negligible, but little change in the average figures was,
under the circumstances, to be expected. To summarize the above, it
appears from the before-after data that quality and crowding were not
major problems for these groups and that only a small portion of the
subsidy was spent on improvement in those categories. The bulk of the
impact of the program apparently went to bring the rent burden down to
a reasonable level.
These results may be trusted, however, only insofar as one may safely
assume that, on average, nothing else besides the subsidies occurred to
change housing status on these dimensions over the time period covered.
That is too strong an assumption. From general observation and
experience alone, one would guess that rents would creep upward over
time, often at a greater rate than income. Crowding might well become
worse through both increase in household size and the choice of some to
move to smaller quarters rather than accept higher rent. Housing
quality might also tend to get worse, both as an alternative to higher rent
and as the result of unchecked deterioration over time. Using the
unmodified &dquo;before&dquo; data risks distorting the true effects of the subsidies
by ignoring these possible hidden movements and assuming that, in the
&dquo;null case&dquo; (that is, without the treatment, or with a zero treatment
effect) housing status after the term of the program would not have
changed at all from before. (We will see when the random-comparison-
group analysis is reported that some of the conclusions based on the
before-after data are in fact quite reasonable; if we had only these data,
however, and so needed to be concerned about events other than the
subsidy program that might have affected the posttest scores, it would
be quite difficult if not impossible to decide whether they were
reasonable or not.) As an alternative to undertaking a more elaborate
and sophisticated analysis, we might simply assume that the differences
or impacts in Table 2 are conservative, as the true null-case posttest
conditions are probably worse (higher scores) than the before data
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indicate, but (a) we cannot really be sure of that; they may in fact be
about right or may even err on the liberal side, (b) if the before-after
results are indeed conservative, we do not know how conservative, and
(c) we would also be essentially uncertain whether the differences are
conservative in all of the categories of deprivation or just some of them,
so that there would be substantial ambiguity regarding the distribution
of the effects of the subsidies across the categories of rent, quality, and
crowding.
Before leaving Design 2, it should be noted that the results on all of
these before-after differences are statistically significant. That is rather a
meaningless and irrelevant bit of information, however, because it tells
us only that it is unlikely that the before-after differences were caused by
random forces. It does not tell us what we are really concerned about,
namely, the extent to which the differences are owing to nonrandom
forces other than the treatment, such as the kind of normally expected
change suggested above or, perhaps, the occurrence of unusual events.
In short, it would be highly desirable to have better indicators of the
null-case outcomes than we have in these &dquo;before&dquo; measures. When
before measures are available but cannot be trusted completely, the
logical place to turn is in the direction of a comparison group.
Optimally, the treatment and comparison groups should be composed
by a process of randomization-beginning with one large group of cities
or individuals and subdividing it at random into experimental and
control groups. In this case, that simply was not done; the evaluators
must make do with the treatment group that was actually used and
whatever comparison groups they can find. Furthermore, it is doubtful
that political and bureaucratic realities would have permitted a rigorous
randomization even if it had been pressed by those thinking ahead to the
needs for evaluation. The design that generally results in such circum-
stances is &dquo;Design 10&dquo; (Campbell and Stanley, 1966: 40), in which the
comparison group is essentially an arbitrary one, usually judgmentally
selected to be as much like the treatment groups as can be obtained
under the circumstances.
We do not have data on such a group to present here. Moreover, it is
important to recognize that the exercise would be essentially uninforma-
tive. We intend to present data on a different sort of comparison
group-one that gives an accurate idea of the null-case outcomes. Had
we a regular Design-10 comparison group as well, we might have found
either that it gave exactly the same accurate information as the group we
actually used or that it was off by a little, or perhaps by a lot in one
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direction or the other, leading toward a certain distortion of the
program effects (such distortion is generally called &dquo;selection bias’~. But
that would be just this one case. It would say nothing about Design-10
comparison groups in general. We could reach no conclusions about
such groups beyond the single case at hand. Moreover, if we had only
the Design-10 comparison group, there would be no way of knowing
how much it distorted outcomes by selection bias in the present case, or
in which direction. One could compare it to the treatment group on
certain available characteristics such as income, age, sex, and racial
composition, but these particular &dquo;selection&dquo; controls are certainly not
all of the variables that matter for rent, crowding, and housing quality.
In principle, one can never know in such a situation whether one has
taken account of all of the variables that do matter in a substantial way
or not. The null-case outcomes would therefore remain quite uncertain.
The random-comparison-group design. Instead of an arbitrary or
judgmentally &dquo;close&dquo; comparison group, we have opted for what has
been called a &dquo;random comparison group&dquo; (Mohr, 1982). In ordinary
Design 10, potential selection bias refers to the possibility that the
treatment and comparison groups differ from one another on variables
that could, in whole or in part, determine outcomes. The critical feature
of the random-comparison-group design is that it introduces a &dquo;criterion
population&dquo; and shifts the concern to possible differences of the
treatment and comparison groups, not from one another, but from that
population. Each group is thus a separate and delimited source of
potential bias. The difference in the two approaches would seem to be
negligible, but a further characteristic of the random-comparison-group
design is that it stipulates the employment of the criterion population
itself, or a random sample from it (hence the label of the design), as the
comparison group for the evaluation study. This eliminates the threat of
selection bias from one of the two possible sources (the comparison
group), thus &dquo;minimaxing&dquo; beforehand the total possible bias. But
further, it provides a basis for using statistics to derive an interval
estimate of program effect in which one can have a substantial degree of
confidence (Mohr, 1982: 64, 66-71).
The criterion population should (1) include the treatment group, (2)
be very much larger than the treatment group, and (3) ideally be the
population to which one would like to generalize the results of the
evaluation. In this case, we chose the whole country as the criterion
population-guided by these three desiderata and by the knowledge
494
that the Annual Housing Survey of a national sample existed-and
selected the study sample as described in the Appendix. We note in
passing that the criterion population need not always be a national
sample of individuals or households. Depending on guideline 3, it might
be the organizations of a certain type in a state or region, the children of
a school district, the professional employees of major accounting firms,
and so forth. Finally, it should be noted that populations that include
the treatment group have no doubt been used from time to time for
comparison groups in program evaluation. In fact, some attempt was
made to construct a comparison group through the use of Annual
Housing Survey data in the 1981 evaluation of the Section 8 Housing
Assistance Program (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, 1981). However, the design employed lacked rigor and made no
attempt to adjust for self-selection into the program. In general, the gain
will never be great if the analysis based on such a design is a
straightforward regression (or comparable) analysis, for then the
statistical validity of the causal inference depends on treating the data as
though they were from a randomized experiment. That is, the results are
only valid if the treatment group can be considered tantamount to a
random sample from the population, which, of course, it generally
cannot be. A modified statistical approach is needed to extract the true
benefits of the comparison group’s being an inclusive population.
The random-comparison-group design and Design 10 are similar in
structure-both designs feature primarily a pretest and a posttest on a
treatment group and a comparison group (other controls or predictors
may be used in place of or in addition to the pretest). Analytic
procedures for the two are fundamentally different, however. The first
difference is that, in Design 10, all subjects in both groups are thrown
together-in a regression analysis, for example-to derive estimates of
the parameters in question, whereas in the random-comparison-group
Design only the comparison group is used for most parameter
estimation. It makes sense to use both groups in Design 10 because the
question of bias involves differences from one another and neither
group can therefore be the more valid or preferred source of information
about parameters. It makes sense to use only one group in the random-
comparison-group design, however, because the bias question involves
differences from a criterion population and one group is that population,
or a random sample from it. When one needs the regression parameter
of posttest on pretest, for example, the true population magnitude is to
be found directly in the comparison group (within random-sampling
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error); mixing the treatment group into the analysis as well yields a
bigger &dquo;N,&dquo; but that in no way begins to compensate for the fact that it
also unnecessarily adds uncertainty and confusion about the magnitude
concerned. The treatment group’s contribution to parameter estimation
may be flawed, both because the treatment itself has muddied the waters
and because the sample is not a random one.
Before proceeding, we take this opportunity to alert the reader that
the analysis must necessarily be somewhat involved. The random-
comparison-group approach is new and, unlike the fine points in an
application of ordinary statistical inference, its various aspects, off-
shoots, and subparts are not second nature to the average reader.
The first step in the analysis, then, is to estimate within the random
comparison group alone the relevant relations of posttest, or depriva-
tion scales, to all predictors to be employed except the treatment. These
data are shown in Table 3.
The regression equation on which these results are based has the
following form for each dwelling unit in the Annual Housing Survey
sample:
where Y is an outcome-a housing deprivation score; a is the constant or
Y-intercept; X, through Xk are predictors of the outcome, including the
before measure; bi through bk are the associated slopes or regression
weights; and e is the error term. Geometrically, this equation denotes a
(k + 1)-dimensional hyperplane. Because a picture becomes essential in
the following analysis, however, we present for illustrative purposes in
Figure 1 a plot of postprogram rent on preprogram rent alone, omitting
all other predictor variables in order to get down to graphable
dimensions. (This particular relationship is selected simply because it
represents the best prediction of an outcome by a single predictor in the
study.)
Next, let us symbolize the program effect for a given outcome
measure, such as rent, as bT’. This is obtained by simple subtraction of
what would have been from what was, that is, subtraction of the
expected null-case mean outcome for the treatment group (predicted on




Comparison Group: Parameter Estimates and t-Values
where E refers to the experimental or treatment group; Y is a mean
outcome or posttest score, such as mean rent; Y is a predicted mean; 0
stands for the null case (so that YoE symbolizes the predicted or expected
null-case outcome for the treatment group), and e~ is the conservative
half of a 95% confidence interval around the predicted value YoE (see
Mohr, 1982: 68-69).
In equation 2, YE is obtained from the observed data for the
treatment group, given previously in Table 2 and repeated in Table 4 for
convenience. YoE is easily obtained by plugging values into equation 1,
as follows: The regression coefficients in that equation (a, bl, ... , bk), are
the estimates of the population parameters for equation 1, obtained
from the Annual Housing Survey sample (comparison group) and given
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Figure 1: Predictions of Null-Case Outcome from the Random£ompa/son4iroup
Design
in Table 3. The values used for the variables Xi through Xk are the
treatment-group means for the respective predictors. The error term is,
of course, omitted in obtaining a predicted, or expected score.
In sum, the predictor-variable data (using all predictors) for the
treatment group are weighted by the respective population parameter
estimates from the comparison group to give the outcome expected if
there had been no program. Or, to put it another way, we consider the
treatment group to be members of the referent population with certain
characteristics, and we use sound estimates of the population param-
eters to project outcomes for subjects with precisely those combinations
of characteristics. That is the strength of the random-comparison-group
design; at best, it uses a correct model of the relevant experience of the
correct population to infer what would have happened to the treatment
group in the absence of the program.
Table 4 shows YoE and bT’, as well as YE, for all of the housing
deprivation scales considered. A better view of the estimation technique
may be obtained by examining the plot in Figure 1. There, the predicted
treatment group mean for the null case, YoE, is seen to fall on the
regression line above XE, the pretest mean (which, in this simplified,
two-dimensional version stands for the centroid of the space defined by
all of the predictor variables actually employed), and bT’, the program
impact, is readily seen to be the distance between this predicted point
498
TABLE 4
Results Based on the Random-Comparison-Group Design
and the observed outcome, YE (in the simplified plot, we disregard the
small quantity e,~). That distance, -$53.55 (see Table 4), is fairly
substantial, indicating a moderate to strong effect of the subsidies on
rent.
It is of some interest in passing to compare the YoE row of Table 4
with the before measures. For example, the effect of the program on rent
(controlled for income as well as other factors) is apparently greater
than use of the before measure suggested; the before measure ($110.35)
does indeed underestimate what rents would have been on average
without the program ($118.42).
The analysis in terms of YoE and bT’ makes a strong assumption,
however, that is generally not warranted-namely, the assumption that
the treatment group is typical of the population, as though it were a
random sample. In principle, the predicted value Y for any given X
should be exactly on the regression line only if the subjects were
randomly selected from among those with that X score, or were a
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random sample of the whole population whose mean happened to be X.
Because our treatment group was not randomly selected, however,
perhaps its mean would, without the subsidy program, have fallen above
or below the line rather than right on it. Unfortunately, we now have no
way of knowing exactly where it would have fallen. In other words,
although there is no selection bias in the comparison group, there may
still be some in the treatment group; given that it is nonrandom, we have
no basis for assuming that it is &dquo;typical.&dquo; To put it another way, one
considers the population parameters to govern the treatment group, but
considers the treatment-group disturbance terms to be a nonrandom
subset. What then should be our estimate of the null-case outcome?
In this case, which is the standard situation in the random-
comparison-group design, it is well both to be conservative and to look
to the within-group error variances for guidance. Mohr (1982) suggests
two &dquo;extreme&dquo; or conservative predicted values-Ext(YoE) and Ext*(YoE)
-depending upon the proportion of the treatment group one feels or
fears might possibly, in the null case, have been posttest outliers on the
population regression plot. Before selecting one of these estimators, let
us take a moment to clarify the concept of &dquo;outlier.&dquo; An outlier is defined
here to be an individual who falls, say, in the 2Y2% of the population
that would-without the program-have been furthest from the
regression surface on the favorable or low-rent side. In other words, an
outlier is someone in the 2Y2% of the population that would have been
&dquo;best off&dquo; without the program. In a normal distribution, which these
error terms approximate rather well, that 2V2% would fall beyond 1.96
error standard deviations below the surface.
How much of the treatment group would have been included in this
2~% of the population-that is, how many would have been low-
deprivation outliers without the program? One extremely conservative
assumption is about 50%. That is, even without the program, approxi-
mately 50% of the treatment group would have become so well off in
housing that they would have fallen into the best 2Y2% of eligibles in the
country by the time of the posttest. That would place the mean outcome
score for the treatment group at the 2~% point, or Ext(YoE) in Figure 1.
To show just what sort of null-case assumption this is and the relation
of the subsidized families to their counterparts in the rest of the country,
a simplified version of the treatment-group plot is superimposed on a
similar version of the comparison-group plot in Figure 2, with the
treatment-group mean at the &dquo;extreme&dquo; point, Ext(~oE) (the true plots
are shown in Figures 3a and 3b for orientation).
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Figure 2: Conservativeness of the Prediction Ext(~(OE) When There Is Variance
in YT
This technique gives us an interval estimate of the magnitude of the
program effect, bT, such that the magnitude is equal to or more
favorable than the distance between the observed outcome and this
conservative estimate or extreme point, that is,
and
or, from equation 3,
where Sue is the error standard deviation for the comparison group and
iToE and ef are as defined in equation 2 (one must be careful to make the
sign on 1.96(s&dquo;c) such that the new estimate is more conservative than
that given by equation 2-from which inequality 4a differs essentially




Before continuing, it is well to note that the interval estimate rendered
in this analysis is not a conventional confidence interval for a regression
coefficient. The role played by such a confidence interval in making an
estimate is, in this analysis, essentially taken by the prediction-error
term, eir. Indeed, as is clear from equation 2, bT does not estimate a
parameter in a regression model at all, but rather is a &dquo;free standing&dquo;
symbol indicating the effect of a treatment.
It is clear from Figure 2 that the average observed or posttest rent-
YE-is barely more favorable than it would have been without the
program (-$5.22-see Table 4), given this very conservative estimate of
what would have been, namely, Ext(YoE). From the analysis, it also
becomes clear what conditions are necessary to be able to infer a
favorable effect with so conservative a technique: either (a) the true
program effect must be extremely large, so that the mean outcome for
the treatment group is far more favorable than the mean outcome for
individuals in the population with the same beginning characteristics, or
(b) the error variance must be extremely small, that is, individuals in the
population must be clustered tightly around the regression surface, so
that even with a moderate program effect, YE will lie far beyond the
extremes. The latter condition may in fact occur frequently in social
programs because an outcome or posttest is often highly predictable
from the pretest. Thus, it should be noted in passing, the pretest can
assume substantial importance in evaluation design and analysis (Mohr,
1982: 71-72)-much more so than in theoretical research. In the present
case, however, it appears that there is so much natural instability in
income and housing conditions among the subject population that,
except for the category of rent, the prediction accuracy of &dquo;after&dquo; from
&dquo;before&dquo; and other measures, although substantial, is still too low to
make a moderate program effect detectable with so conservative an
approach (see Table 3 and 4).
There will doubtless be general agreement, however, that the
approach is unwarrantedly conservative in the present instance if one
wishes to make a reasonably accurate estimate of the effect of the
program rather than simply avoid error. The treatment group is a
broadly based selection of eligibles from all major regions of the
country, not chosen on the basis of any apparent peculiarities. Its
members are probably fairly typical of the population as a whole. We
may be unwilling to assume that they are in essence a random sample,
but we certainly do not need to assume that they are so extreme that 50%
of them would have been outliers, as in Figure 2. One way to look at the
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possible conservativeness of the assumption in the general case is the
following: The estimate bT as defined in inequality 4 is ultraconservative
to the extent that the treatment group is heterogeneous, that is, to the
extent that the original variance in its Y scores is substantial. The
extreme opposite-a homogeneous treatment group-would be a group
with one common outcome score, as though it were one individual. In
the null case, that one score could reasonably have fallen anywhere in
the plot. Estimating that it would have fallen at the 2~% mark is not
terribly conservative because that estimate does not make the score into
a hardly believable outlier. Substantial variance in the outcome scores,
however, makes outliers out of 50% and very distant outliers out of
as much as 30%-40% of the group when its midpoint is placed at the
extreme point, as in inequality 4. To see this visually, note in Figure 2
how far the treatment-group plot in this assumed position sticks out
below the population plot of which it is supposed to be a subgroup.
An excellent way to moderate the ultraconservatism is by assuming a
still-conservative but more believable proportion of outliers (after
defining the outlier point as, say, 2~%). One might allow 10% outliers
for the null case, for example, instead of either 2~/2%, as in equation 2, or
50%, as in inequality 4. To do this, one would move the expected
null-case mean for the treatment group from the outlier point toward
the center by 1.28(SuE), which covers 40% of the cases in a normal
distribution, leaving 10% rather than 50% as outliers. We would then
have a new prediction, Ext*(YoE), as follows (see Figure 2):
and a new program effect parameter, bT*, as follows:
or, from equations 6, 5, and 3,
It is still rather difficult to believe that 10% of the treatment group are
outliers given the similarity of original means and variances and other
characteristics of the treatment and comparison groups in the present
case, but that is a reasonable penalty to incur for an estimate of
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minimum program effect in which both analyst and audience may have
substantial confidence.
Table 4 shows that for rent bT* = -$43.18. The connection between the
treatment group and the population employed as the comparison group
permits this result to have a valid statistical interpretation (not possible
in Design 10), as follows (Mohr, 1982: 71): Assuming that as many as
10% of the treatment group might have been population outliers on the
favorable side-that is, beyond the -.025 level without the treatment-
one may say with 97.5% confidence that one of the effects of the
program was to lower average rent paid by $43.18 or more. Similarly, we
find that, at the same level of confidence, rent burdens were reduced by
an average of at least 0.09. Because the final outcome YE for rent burden
was observed to be 0.23, the program may be said here, as with the
before-after design, to have brought average rent burden below the 25%
mark, as desired. The before-after design suggested a modest effect of
the program on housing quality (-.06). If the treatment group were a
random sample of the eligible population, the random-comparison-
group method would also find a modest effect (in Table 4, bT = -.07).
Given the hedging necessitated by the nonrandomness of the treatment
group, however, no favorable impact of the program on housing quality
may be inferred with confidence. Similarly, no favorable program
impact on crowding may be inferred, although in that case, as noted
previously, none was to be expected; all relevant measures indicate that
crowding would not, on average, have been a problem without the
program.
It will be useful at this point to say a brief, clarifying word about the
relation of the random-comparison-group design to selection bias.
There is essentially no way to overcome the possibility of selection bias
in a design featuring the arbitrary selection of treatment and compar-
ison groups. Methods that approach the problem by using additional
data to model the selection decision-model the differences between the
two groups-depend on getting those differences just right (see
Blumstein and Cohen, 1979; Heckman, 1976). However, one never
knows whether one has included all of the important variables.
Amemiya’s (1973) method for overcoming the selection bias involved in
truncated samples does not apply to the ordinary case of program
evaluation because of the absence of a truncation point: All relevant
scores on the dependent variable may fall anywhere along its entire
range. The present method is different from these others in two respects.
It operates in part by means of the selection process itself, which is how
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the bias is neutralized in true experiments and in the regression-discon-
tinuity design (Campbell and Stanley, 1966). In this case, there is the
selection of a certain sort of comparison group. For the rest, it does not
try to neutralize selection bias so much as to apply a practical and
persuasive hedge against it.
Use of the subsidv. Having derived solidly based, if perhaps
conservative, estimates of the various impacts of the program, it remains
to speculate on how the subsidy was used by the recipients. That is not
an easy task. To accomplish it precisely, one would want to know the
exact conditions of housing, rent, and income that would have prevailed
in the absence of the program-what we have called the null-case
outcomes-and then the true conditions at the posttest time selected.
Part of the subsidy could then be deduced to have been spent by that
time for specific improvements in the housing standard and the balance
for reducing the rent expenditure, thus freeing funds for other expenses
of living. We may do this only roughly for three reasons.
First, we do not have firm data on the null-case conditions. We have
only the before measures, whose accuracy must be questioned, and the
estimates based on the comparison group, which must be hedged. The
latter are clearly the preferred type of indicator; we will therefore use the
estimates based on the comparison group and resort to providing
conclusions in a range that is somewhat wider than would be desired.
Second, the housing conditions on which we have data are only
quality, as measured, and crowding. These leave out many possible
expenditures that are housing related and to which the subsidies of some
households may have been devoted such as quality of neighborhood,
draftiness, paint condition, privacy, location, esthetics, and elements of
total space such as porches, bathrooms, basement, yard, closets, and
size of rooms. The key to reaching reasonably accurate conclusions
about expenditures for improved housing without these details lies in
the variable &dquo;rent.&dquo; The use of the subsidy may conveniently be divided
into just two parts-the amount that went into higher rent and the
amount that went into relief of the rent burden (that is, smaller out-of-
pocket expenditure for the same rent). Both parts may readily be
calculated from the available data. The portion of the subsidy spent for
improved conditions of housing is contained in the first part-the
amount spent for higher rent.
Third, once it is determined how much of the subsidy was devoted to
higher rent, it is still unclear how much of that amount simply covered a
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price increase and how much went toward better housing. As noted, we
do not have detailed measures of housing conditions in the AAE data
for the treatment group, nor do we have them in the Annual Housing
Survey data for the comparison group. With a few reasonable assump-
tions, however, we can go a substantial distance toward separating price
increase from quality increase. We know that some families in the
program moved and some did not. We will assume that those who
moved did so to change their housing conditions in one or more
desirable ways (indeed, moving in the context of this program was done
in order to get out of unacceptable housing and qualify for the subsidy)
and further assume that those who stayed in the same housing either did
not get improved conditions or, at any rate, did not pay for them. The
average additional rent paid by the movers then represents the total
amount that recipients paid for desirable changes in housing conditions
(whether at inflated prices or not). The balance of all increased rent
covered price increases on housing in which recipients remained over the
whole time period covered. Thus, we will observe the allocation of the
subsidy to three functions: relief of rent burden, improvement in
housing conditions, and price increases for current housing.
The average subsidy in the program was $80.88 per month and the
average posttest out-of-pocket rent paid was $63.64. Thus, the sum of
these, or $144.52, was the average dollar rent actually paid to the
landlord after the program. The amount that would have been paid,
given as Y OE in Table 4, was $118.42, so that the difference, $144.52 -
$118.42 = $26.10, is the amount of the average subsidy that was put into
higher rent. This represents 32% of the total subsidy, a portion to which
we will return momentarily for further analysis. The balance, $54.78 or
68%, went to relieve the rent burden; that is, it was freed for other uses
(we neglect the interval &dquo;feY&dquo; because it will become part of a larger
interval momentarily; otherwise, the quantity $54.78 would be the same
as that indicated by b/ in equation 2 and Table 4). Knowing that 68% of
the subsidy went toward (a) relief of the rent burden, it remains to divide
the 32% between (b) better quality housing, and (c) a price increase for
the same dwelling unit. This we attempt by examining the record of the
movers (N = 356, or 45% of the total AAE sample-see Table 5).
The average dollar rent paid at posttest time by those families that
actually moved was $160.92 (including $90.30 in average subsidy), and
the null-case rent (based on YoE) for that group averaged $102.43 (note
that the random-comparison-group design enables the analyst to derive
a null-case estimate for any subgroup, or indeed any individual, and not
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TABLE 5
Comparison Group, Treatment Group, and
Treatment-Group Movers
just the treatment group as a whole). The difference, $58.49 per family or
65% of the subsidy, is the amount paid in higher rent, which in this
subgroup means the amount paid for improved conditions of housing.
Inasmuch as these subjects made up 45% of the recipients and their rent
increase represents the total of improved housing conditions for the
treatment group as a whole, then (.45)($58.49) = $26.32 is the average
amount put into better housing within the treatment group as a whole.
This yields a result that may appear surprising. The quantity $26.32 is
32% of the average subsidy ($80.88) for the treatment group. It will be
recalled that 32% of the subsidy over the whole group was paid in higher
rent. Thus, we have found that all of the average subsidy going into
higher rent was spent for better conditions of housing; none, on the
average, went toward increased price for the same housing. Although
somewhat surprising, the result is solidly based in null-case projections,
for both the treatment group and the &dquo;mover&dquo; subgroup, within the
random-comparison-group framework. As it happens, the finding
accords well with the results of the supply experiment described
previously, so that both are supported by the corroboration. It appears
that there was little price inflation (above whatever may be reflected in
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the comparison-group data) for the current housing of these individuals
during the period of the study.
These estimates, however, assume that the treatment group is average
in posttest rent for similar households in the population (where
&dquo;similar&dquo; means having the same mean scores as the treatment group on
income, prior rent, and the other causal variables in Table 3). We have
found that such projections need to be converted to interval estimates to
provide a safe conservatism. In the present analysis, however, conserva-
tive cannot be taken to mean a smaller impact of the program on rent
relief, for that would simply imply liberal inferences of impact on
improvement in conditions of housing. What is needed, then, is a
symmetric, or two-sided, interval around the rent impact, based on the
same method as was used in the previous section, that is, equations 5 and
6. This yields an interval estimate of 68% f 14% for the proportion of
the subsidy going toward rent relief and 32% f 14% for the part going
toward higher rent. Furthermore, detailed, comparative random-
comparison-group analyses for movers and &dquo;stayers&dquo; show that when
the latter interval is at its high end, or 46%, nearly all (85%) of this rent
increase is found to be attributable to improved quality, and when it is at
its low end, or 18%, so much is attributable to quality that substantial
price deflation is implied for those who did not move to better housing
(an unlikely result that therefore suggests, as suspected, that our interval
of ±14% is unnecessarily large because the assumption of 10% outliers
is still unnecessarily conservative).
In brief, we find that 68% t 14% of the subsidy went to relieve the rent
burden and the balance to improvements in quality. The interval is
large, but (a) its method, which allows 10% outliers on each end, is
apparently too conservative, so that the 68-32 split is undoubtedly more
accurate than the breadth of the interval suggests, and (b) it still permits
informative conclusions about the impact of the program to be drawn. It
appears that the bulk of the subsidy went to liberate funds in these
low-income families for nonrent uses. The remainder was spent on
improvements in housing quality obtained by families that had to move
to better housing in order to qualify for the program. This was nearly
half (45%) of the treatment group (whereas 30% moved during this time
in the comparison group, and it is unclear whether they moved to better
or worse housing). On average, the group of movers started out paying
much lower rent than the treatment group as a whole ($90.83 versus
$110.35), received a larger subsidy ($90.30 versus $80.88), and ended by
paying higher amounts for rent out of pocket ($70.62 versus $63.64).
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The movers improved their conditions of housing substantially, repre-
sented by at least 18% and probably about 32% of the subsidy for the
group as a whole. This amount primarily bought quality that is not
detailed in our measures. It is reflected in part, but only in part, by a
larger-than-average increase in quality as measured here-moving from
nearly one item failed in the null case to essentially zero after the
subsidy-and a larger-than-average, though still very small, improve-
ment in crowding, going from 0.8 persons per room in the null case to 0.7
after the program. The evaluation could have been even more informa-
tive if more detailed observations had been recorded on conditions of
housing in both the treatment and comparison groups, but the latter is
perhaps too troublesome to be expected.
The precision provided by the random-comparison-group design
could have been improved by accepting less confidence in the results-
the usual trade-off in classical statistical inference-and by better
prediction in the comparison-group model. On the latter point, the
present evaluation suffers because there is substantial unpredictable
fluctuation in rent and income over a year’s time in the poverty class.
That is why the RZ in the national sample is as low as it is (although very
high in comparison with theoretical social research). There would surely
be evaluations in which the posttest were more predictable from the
pretest and other variables, so that even conservative estimates from the
random-comparison-group design would yield readily satisfying preci-
sion in results.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In this analysis we have utilized data from the EHAP Administrative
Agency Experiment and the Annual Housing Survey to test the effects
of housing vouchers on the housing conditions of low-income families.
With a full understanding of both the design and data limitations of the
AAE, we proceeded to show how demonstration projects of this sort can
be used in social program evaluation with a reasonable degree of
confidence in the results through employing the random-comparison-
group design. We examined two types of program outcome in the
analysis: (1) the impact of the program on reducing housing deprivation
scores for participants, and (2) the manner in which the subsidy was used
by participating households. These are key issues concerning housing
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vouchers and our findings tend to support as well as augment some of
the findings from the supply and demand experiments. (We remind the
reader that the supply and demand experiments have the drawback that
they represent only two locations each, whereas the AAE represents
eight widely scattered and diverse markets, with null-case projections
based here on a national sample.)
In examining program impacts on reducing housing deprivation, our
results showed that, overall, the program had its greatest impact in
reducing rents and rent burdens. In terms of housing quality as
measured directly for this analysis, the impact was slight for the group as
a whole. For movers, however, it is clear that a substantial shift from
substandard to standard housing did occur. One indicator is that this
group paid about 65% of its subsidy in higher rent. Another (see Table 5)
is that the mean failure score for movers on the quality index was one
full item before the program (16% of the six-item index) and one-third of
an item afterwards (5%-see the Appendix for the discrepancy between
this index and the criteria for substandard housing actually used in the
AAE).
Our findings on allocation of the subsidy were strikingly similar to
findings from the demand experiment. In the demand experiment
approximately 75% of the housing allowance went toward reduction in
rent burden. We found approximately 68% of the subsidy going to
address this problem in the AAE. The other 25% of the subsidy in the
demand experiment went toward increased housing expenditures,
which could have and probably did prominently include improvements
in housing quality. We found that 32% of the subsidy went toward
higher rents in the AAE and all of this amount seemed to have been
devoted to improvements in housing quality.
One of the major findings from the supply experiment was that a
full-scale open-enrollment allowance program did not have perceptible
effects on rents or property values in either a tight housing market
(Green Bay) or a loose market (South Bend). Lowry offers the following
explanation:
One reason was that the program increased aggregate housing demand by less than
2 percent. Another was that it proved relatively easy and inexpensive to transform
substandard to standard dwelling units. When a renter joined the program without
moving, his rent typically increased by less than 2 percent, even though his landlord
may have made minor repairs to bring the dwellings up to program standards
[Lowry, 1983: 26].
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The present findings buttress these conclusions. In examining the
32% of the subsidy not going to reduce the rent burden, we asked how
much went toward improved housing quality and how much toward
inflated rents. Using outcomes for movers as the basis for our analysis,
we conclude that all of the subsidy went for improved quality and none
for inflated rent. In fact, for recipients who did not move, we found that
price deflation might have occurred. The on-site observer case study
data from the AAE tends to support this finding. Generally, landlords as
well as recipients in the AAE found housing assistance with &dquo;no strings
attached&dquo; an attractive idea and may very well have made rent
adjustments to meet HUD’s recommended fair market rents (see
Jackson, 1982: 175 for a full listing of these reports).
Clearly, it is problematic to generalize to a national program of
subsidies from a study that included only pockets of the population and
that was evaluated after only one year. With that caveat, our findings
support the idea that by providing housing vouchers to low-income
families, substantial reductions in their out-of-pocket income for rent
will occur. For those families having to move to satisfy the minimum
standard requirement, there is less relief of the rent burden, but
substantial improvements in housing quality are made. Keeping in mind
the reservations that opened this paragraph, all of these results may
apparently be obtained without creating rent inflation in the housing
market.
We cannot conclude, however, without taking note of an important
caveat based on previous work. Budding (1978) and Jackson (1982,
chap. 4) show that a large percentage of preprogram enrollees were
dropped from the program because their housing units were sub-
standard and they could not find adequate housing in the housing
market. In other words, the minimum housing-quality standard lowered
the participation rates of needy families. As Frieden (1980) concluded
some years ago, housing allowances do work. It would be an error,
however, to assume that they leave no major pockets of need unmet.
513
APPENDIX
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPARISON GROUP
FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY EXPERIMENT
USING ANNUAL HOUSING SURVEY DATA
Data from the 1974 and 1975 national files of the Annual Housing Survey
were utilized in constructing a comparison group for the administrative agency
experiment. The purpose of this appendix is to describe the selection technique
used in constructing the comparison group.
First, the years 1974 and 1975 were chosen as the two years that most closely
approximated the time period in which the experiment was implemented.
Second, a procedure was developed comparable to the one utilized by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development for selecting families who
would be eligible for the housing allowance program. The key to the procedure
involved first determining a market rent that the Department of Housing and
Urban Development would be willing to pay for a housing unit of standard
quality in a given housing market. This rent is frequently referred to as a fair
market rent and is normally determined by the regional area office in
conjunction with the local housing authority.
The procedure for determining this rent is imprecise and subject to variation
from one locale to the next. Recently, hedonic price indices have been employed
in determining fair market rents (Follain and Malpezzi, 1981). Instead of using
an elaborate technique such as a hedonic price index to determine the fair
market rents for this analysis, average rents for units with 0 to 9 bedrooms were
used. An average rent for each number of bedrooms was taken for each region.
Substandard units and units subsidized by the government were eliminated from
the sample prior to taking the averages.
In a memo issued to the public agencies administering the administrative
agency experiment, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
specified the number of bedrooms for which a family would be subsidized based
on the number of persons in the family. The next step was to assign the
appropriate fair market rent (the average rent) to each household in the AHS
based on the household size, the number of bedrooms HUD was willing to
subsidize in that instance, and the region in which the household was located.
Finally, to determine whether or not a family would be eligible for a housing
allowance, the assigned fair market rent was divided by the family’s total
income. Those families with rent-income ratios above .25 were considered
eligible for the program. The procedure was employed on renters in 1974 and
1975. Only families qualifying for the program in both years were used in the
comparison group. In this fashion, the selection procedure employed here
514
approximated closely the one used by the housing allowance agencies in
selecting AAE participants.
B. MEASURES OF HOUSING DEPRIVATION USED
IN THE TREATMENT AND COMPARISON GROUPS
The national housing goal of the United States adopted by Congress in the
Housing Act of 1949 called for a &dquo;decent home and suitable living environment
for every American family.&dquo;The definition of a decent home and suitable living
environment has varied over time and it has been left to policymakers to
decipher congressional intent.
Three major aspects of housing have evolved as the principal components of
congressional concern: deficient or substandard housing, crowding, and
affordability. Measures used in this analysis for these three forms of housing
deprivation come from a general set of guidelines issued to all experimental
housing allowance agencies by the Division of Housing Assistance Research
within the Office of Policy Development and Research, HUD. The three
categories of deprivation were operationalized as follows.
CROWDING
Families having more than 1.5 persons per room were considered as living in
overcrowded conditions. For this analysis, the total number of persons in a
household was divided by the total number of rooms in the housing unit. Instead
of using the dichotomy, &dquo;crowded-not crowded&dquo; based on the demarcator of 1.5,
the exact ratio of persons to rooms was employed as a continuous variable. This
allowed us to examine the extent to which persons per room changed as an
impact of the program. Sample data from the administrative agencies’
enrollment and payment operating forms were used to operationalize the pre-
and postprogram measures of crowding for the treatment group. Data from the
1974 and 1975 AHS tapes were used to measure persons per room for the
comparison group.
RENT BURDEN
The proportion of a family’s income devoted to rent had been the principal
measure of housing affordability in housing policy analysis. Most studies, as
well as the guidelines issued to EHAP agencies, use .25 as an appropriate
fraction of income to be paid in rent. Families paying more than 25% of their
income for rent are considered as having a deprivation-level rent burden.
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For this analysis, rent burden was operationalized by dividing a family’s gross
rent (rent plus utilities) by the total family income. Data from AAE enrollment
and payment operating forms on rent and income were used in developing
before-and-after measures for the treatment group. Instead of using a dichotomy
based on .25, the full rent/income ratio was employed to indicate rent burden
before and after the program. For the comparison group, similar data were lifted
from the AHS tapes for 1974 and 1975.
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HOUSING QUALITY
The guidelines issued by the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment to EHAP program agencies provided for a minimum housing quality
standard. Although this standard was not rigorously enforced in the administra-
tive agency experiment it did serve as a guideline for agencies in assessing the
quality of units in their respective jurisdictions. The minimum standard
consisted of 14 components falling into three general categories: basic housing
services (core room presence, complete plumbing, complete kitchen facilities,
light fixtures, electrical services); safety features (adequate exits, presence and
safety of heating equipment); structure and surface condition (room
structure, room surface, floor structure, floor surface, roof structure, exterior
walls). For a complete description of these minimum standard requirements see
the Minimum Standard Requirement report produced by ABT Associates
(Baker et al., 1980). A fourth category, the presence of rats, was added for use in
this analysis.
Given that the Annual Housing Survey data do not contain enough detail to
allow full operationalization of the minimum standard requirement, a modified
housing-quality index was constructed based on comparable items from the
AAE housing-quality surveys and the AHS housing-quality section. The
housing-quality index used in this analysis for both the treatment and control
groups was based on the following components taken primarily from the
minimum standard requirements:
I. complete kitchen facilities,
2. complete plumbing facilities,
3. adequate heat,
4. roof condition,
5. wall condition, and
6. presence of rats.
Instead of classifying units as substandard for a failure on any one of these
items, a ratio measure was developed measuring the percentage of items failed
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